The formal coalition between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in made them both parties of government. It had ministers from both parties and committed them to collective responsibility, with the parties expected to vote the same way on government legislation.
In a situation of no overall control, the incumbent government gets the first chance at creating a coalition. If they cannot do this or create a formal coalition, the prime minister will have to resign. The leader of the largest opposition party may then be invited to form a government and may do so either as a minority or in coalition with another party or parties. There may be a period of confusion and flux if there are two large parties trying to form coalitions with smaller ones at the same time.
While all this is going on, the Queen will probably stay away from London and only come back when it is clear which parties are going to form a government and who will be prime minister.
This article is more than 6 years old. Essentially, one may distinguish two main aspects of coalition formation theories.
One of them concerns the formation of groups, that is, the process through which a coalition comes together to coordinate its actions. Another aspect of coalition formation theories involves the enforcement of group actions as the equilibrium of an appropriate game. Skip to main content. Structure Partners Scientific Board Secretariat. Search form Search. Coalition Formation Theory.
Working paper. Alternative representation of semivalues, the inverse problem and coalitional rationality. Irinel Dragan and Pierre Dehez. Paths to stability for overlapping group structures. Approximate Coalitional Equilibria in the Bipolar World. Andrei Golman, Daniil Musatov. From theory to application. Transfers, self-enforcing agreements and climate cooperation. Common ranking and stability of overlapping coalitions.
Constitutions and groups. Immunity to credible deviations from the truth. Collusive Agreements in Vertically Differentiated Markets. Marco A. Sareh Vosooghi. On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games. Nizar Allouch, Myrna Wooders.
Locating a public good on a sphere. Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements. The Dynamics of Conflict. Endogenous Correlated Network Dynamics. Coalitional Bargaining with Consistent Counterfactuals. Roberto Burguet and Ramon Caminal. Determining influential models. Michel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska. We consider a model of opinion formation based on aggregation functions. Doruk Iris, Alessandro Tavoni.
Strongly rational sets for normal-form games. Autonomous coalitions. Allocation rules for coalitional network games. Johannes Emmerling. Alliance Formation in a Vertically Differentiated Market. Jean J. Gabszewicz, Marco A. Marini and Ornella Tarola. The timing of contests. Gilles Grandjean, Petros G. We develop a simple model to analyze the timing of contests. Coalitions and Networks.
The division problem under constraints. Networks and Coalitions: Interview with Four Experts. Handbook of Game Theory, 1st Edition. Tranferable and non transferable utility implementations of coalitional stability in integrated assessment models. Matthew O. Jackson, Stephen Nei. Pairing Games and Markets. Ahmet Alkan, Alparslan Tuncay. The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions. Carlo Carraro. Gabrielle Demange and Myrna Wooders.
Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership. Moreno-Ternero and Shlomo Weber. Stable and efficient coalitional networks. Sempere-Monerris and Vincent Vannetelbosch. Contractually stable alliances. A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes. Ulrich Faigle, Michel Grabisch. Bargaining and Power.
Dominik Karos. Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games. Sempere-Monneris and Vincent Vannetelbosch. Dynamic Competition with Consumer Inertia. Influence networks. Dunia Lopez-Pintado. Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets : the case of countable state space.
Victor Domansky et Victoria Kreps. Centralizing Information in Networks. Jeanne Hagenbach. Team Formation in a Network.
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